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The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of inequalities and economic convergence on 
the efficient discount rate, in the absence of any risk-sharing scheme. We consider an 
economy in which the initial consumption level and the distribution of consumption growth 
are heterogeneous. The benchmark case is when inequalities are permanent and relative risk 
aversion is constant. The discount rate is not affected by inequalities in that case. We first 
relax the assumption on risk aversion, and we derive conditions under which permanent 
inequalities reduce the discount rate. If relative prudence is larger than unity, an increase in 
economic convergence always raises the efficient discount rate. In a realistic calibration 
exercise, we show that the effect of economic convergence is to triple the discount rate, from 
less 2% to more than 6%. 
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Agreement no. 230589. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper, we address the question of the impact of current and future
wealth inequalities on the choice of the discount rate. Most models aimed at
determining the rate at which one should discount future cash ﬂows assume
that there is a representative agent in the economy.1 As is well-known, this
assumption allows for the existence of wealth inequalities, as long as risks
c a nb es h a r e de ﬃciently and credit markets are eﬃcient. However, these
assumptions are rather unrealistic, in particular when we consider long time
horizons. Commitment problems, transaction costs, adverse selection and
moral hazard limits the ability to reallocate consumption across states of na-
ture and through time in our society. Even within the European Community,
individual countries are strongly reluctant to share risk with other countries
of the EC, as illustrated by the 2010 Greek episode. Our aim is to examine
the impact of inequalities on the eﬃcient discount rate without assuming
that consumption is eﬃciently allocated across states and through time.
Ramsey (1928) provides the benchmark model to determine the eﬃcient
discount rate, i.e., the minimum rate of return of safe investment projects
that makes them socially desirable to implement. Putting aside the standard
preference for the present, the main ingredient of this model is the aversion
to consumption ﬂuctuations over time, which is modelled by the concavity of
the utility function u(c) .I fa g e n t se x p e c tt h a tt h e i rincome will increase over
time, they will accept to save some of their income today only if the return
on their saving is large enough to compensate for the increased intertemporal
consumption inequality that it will generate. The so-called Ramsey rule tells
us that this discount rate net of the rate of impatience equals the product
of the growth rate of consumption and the index of relative risk aversion,
w h i c hi sm e a s u r e db y−cu00(c)/u0(c). Adding an uncertain growth rate into
the picture has been done by Hansen and Singleton (1983), Gollier (2002), or
Weitzman (2007) for example. Prudent agents want to save more when their
future become more uncertain. At the collective level, this implies a reduction
of the discount rate. In the small, this precautionary eﬀect is proportional to
the product of the variance of the growth rate of consumption by the relative
aversion to downside risk, which is measured by c2u000(c)/u0(c)( K e e n a na n d
1A noticeable exception is Azar and Sterner (1996) and Emmerling (2010) in the context
of climate change.
1Snow (2005)).
Let us introduce inequalities into this model. They can take the form
of heterogeneities in the individual levels of initial consumption, or in the
rate at which this consumption will increase over time. As soon as risk-
s h a r i n go rc r e d i tm a r k e t sa r ei n e ﬃcient, the notion of discount rate becomes
problematic, since the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution becomes
individual-speciﬁc. One euro transferred from today to the future has a social
value that depends on the characteristics of the beneﬁciary of this transfer.
In this paper, we consider an investment project whose all costs and beneﬁts
are equally shared in the population.
Suppose ﬁrst that there is no economic convergence across dynasties or
countries. This means that inequalities are stable through time. Under the
veil of ignorance, this type of inequalities is equivalent to adding the same
proportional risk e z to ﬁnal consumption at all dates. In other words, it is
equivalent to determining the impact of a change of marginal utility function
from u0 to v0, with v0(c)=Eu0(ce z). What is the eﬀect of this additional
permanent risk on the discount rate? Signing the impact on the wealth ef-
fect requires comparing the relative risk aversion of u and v. Following a
methodology developed in Gollier and Pratt (1996) and Gollier and Kimball
(1996), we show that adding this permanent risk raises the concavity of the
indirect utility function v — and therefore raises the discount rate — only if
some restrictive conditions related to the fourth derivative of u. Similarly,
signing the impact of this permanent level of inequalities on the precaution-
ary eﬀect requires comparing the relative aversion to downside risk of u and
v. We show that doing this necessitates conditions on the ﬁfth derivative
of the utility function. In the special case of a power utility function, nei-
ther the wealth eﬀect nor the precautionary eﬀect is aﬀected by permanent
inequalities, so that they have no eﬀect on the discount rate.
But the degree of inequalities is not stable through time. Several authors
have tested the plausibility of economic convergence, i.e., poor regions tend
to grow faster then rich ones in per capita terms. For example, Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1992) exploited data on personal incomes in 48 U.S. states
since 1840, and obtained clear evidence of convergence. Convergence reduces
inequalities over time. Under the veil of ignorance, it reduces the uncertainty
for future generations. It is thus intuitive that economic convergence raises
t h ed i s c o u n tr a t e ,s i n c ei tt e n d st os w i t c ho ﬀ the precautionary motive for a
small discount rate. We prove that this intuition is correct by using a simple
2deﬁnition of comparative convergence from Tchen (1980) and Epstein and
Tanny (1980).
2 The discount rate for a uniform allocation
of cash-ﬂows
We consider a model with two arbitrary dates 0 and t. Agents diﬀer on
their initial wealth c0 and on their expectations about their consumption at
date t. The distributions of initial and ﬁnal consumption are characterized
by random variable e c0 and e ct, respectively. Let e y denote the gross growth
rate of consumption between 0 and t, which implies that e ct = e c0e y.If e y is
independent of e c0, we say that consumption inequalities are permanent. In
the second part of this paper, we will allow e y and e c0 to be statistically
related, thereby allowing the possibility of economic convergence. We treat
e c0 and e y as exogeneous random variables. This intertemporal allocation of
consumption may or may not be eﬃcient.
We suppose that all agents have the same von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function u, and the same rate of pure preference for the present δ.
We assume that u is diﬀerentiable up to the ﬁfth order. The social welfare






Notice that the expectation operator in this equation plays two roles. First,
it computes the expected utility E [u(e ct) | c0] of an agent with an initial
consumption c0. Second, it takes the mean the individual expected utility
levels. In this model, two agents i and j with the same c0 but diﬀerent
expectations e yi and e yj will be treated as if they would both have the same
expectations described by (e y1,1/2;e y2,1/2).
We are interested in characterizing the impact of inequalities and eco-
nomic convergence on the socially eﬃcient discount rate. In order to deﬁne
i t ,w ec o n s i d e ras u r ei n v e s t m e n tp r o j e c tt h a tr e d u c e sa l la g e n t s ’c u r r e n t
consumption by ε and that increases all agents’ consumption at date t by
εexp(rt). Because marginal rates of substitution are generally not equalized
in this model, the way in which cash-ﬂows are allocated in the economy will
3matter for the determination of the eﬃcient discount rate. It is crucial to
keep in mind that we consider a uniform allocation of costs and beneﬁts in
this paper. The socially eﬃcient discount rate rt is the internal rate of re-
turn r of the project such that implementing the project has no eﬀe c ta tt h e
margin on SWF. It yields







The benchmark case is obtained without any inequality, i.e., when e c0 has
a Dirac distribution δc0. If the support of e y is in a small neighborhood of
c0,w h i c hi st h ec a s ew h e nt is small, we can estimate u0(c0y)b yu s i n ga
second-order Taylor expansion around c0. As shown for example in Gollier
(2010), it yields the following approximation, which is usually referred to as
the extended Ramsey rule (Hansen and Singleton (1983)):







where gt = t−1E(y −1) is the expected growth rate of consumption between
0a n dt,a n dσ2
t = t−1Va r(y) is the annualized variance of the growth rate of





as the relative concavity of the ith derivative of u, which is itself denoted
u[i]. For example, R1, R2 and R3 denote respectively relative risk aversion,
relative prudence and relative temperance. Equation (2) is referred to as
the ”extended Ramsey rule”. The right-hand side of equation (2) exhibits
the three determinants of the eﬃcient discount rate: impatience, the wealth
eﬀect and the precautionary eﬀect. The wealth eﬀect measured by R1gt is
positive if the expected growth rate gt is positive. In that case, investing for
the future raises intertemporal inequalities, which is bad for intertemporal
welfare. We are thus willing to sacriﬁce more of current wealth only if it is
compensated by a positive return of the investment. Technically, this wealth
eﬀect comes from the fact that the marginal utility of consumption is smaller
in the future if one believes that one will be wealthier in the future. The
intensity of the wealth eﬀect is proportional to relative risk aversion R1,
4which measures the speed at which marginal utility decreases when wealth
increases.
The precautionary eﬀect is measured by −0.5R1R2σ2
t. Under positive
prudence (u000 ≥ 0, or R2 ≥ 0), this precautionary eﬀect tends to reduce
the discount rate. Intuitively, the uncertainty on future growth makes pru-
dent people more willing to transfer consumption to the future. This corre-
sponds to the well-known precautionary saving motive (Leland (1968), Dr` eze
and Modigliani (1972)). At the collective level, this increased willingness to
transfer consumption to the future takes the form of a reduction of the dis-
count rate. Technically, this eﬀe c tc o m e sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tu n d e rp o s i t i v e
prudence, the convexity of marginal utility implies that the uncertainty on
future consumption raises the expected marginal utility of future consump-
tion. As shown by Kimball (1990), the uncertainty of future consumption has
an eﬀect on the willingness to save that is equivalent to a sure reduction of
t h eg r o w t hr a t eo fc o n s u m p t i o ne q u a l i ng the precautionary premium. This
precautionary premium is approximately equal to 0.5R2σ2
t, where the index
of relative prudence R2 measures the degree of convexity of marginal utility.
Because that equivalent reduction in the growth rate has an eﬀect on the ef-
ﬁcient discount rate that is proportional to R1, we see that the precautionary
eﬀect is proportional to the product of R1 and R2.
3T h e e ﬀect of inequalities without conver-
gence
In this section, we assume that the economy exhibits no tendency of economic
convergence. This means that e c0 and e yt are independent random variables.
All individual consumption levels ﬂuctuate proportionally to each others:
when Mr Smith’s consumption level doubles, so does Mr Jones’ consumption
level.
Let us ﬁrst consider a simple benchmark case in which u0(c)=c−γ,w h e r e
γ = R1 is the constant degree of relative risk aversion. Notice that for such
power functions, the index of aversion Ri is constant and equal to R1+i−1.
In that case, we obtain the following sequence of equalities:

























This means that in this benchmark case, the existence of an initial inequality
in consumption has no eﬀect on the socially eﬃcient discount rates, and on
its term structure. If we assume that log e y is normally distributed with mean
μ and variance σ2
y, this equation can be rewritten as
rt = δ −
1
t




because the Arrow-Pratt approximation is exact in that case. Notice that it
implies that equation (2) is exact under this speciﬁcation.
We hereafter determine conditions on u under which the existence of no-








where c0 = Ee c0 is the average consumption level at date t =0 .L e te c0 equal
c0e z,w i t hEe z =1 .U s i n gt h ef a c tt h a te z and e y, we deﬁne the indirect utility








If this inequality is reversed, no-convergent economic inequalities reduce the
eﬃcient discount rate. We hereafter consider two diﬀerent contexts of eco-
nomic growth. In the ﬁrst context, all individual consumption levels increase
a tt h es a m es u r ep o s i t i v er a t e .I nt h es e c o n dc o n t e x t ,a l li n d i v i d u a lc o n s u m p -
tion levels increase by the same uncertain zero-mean rate.
3.1 The growth rate is a sure positive constant
Suppose that there exists some scalar k>1 such that e y = k almost surely.







6Since no restriction limits the choice of c0, a necessary and suﬃcient condition
is that the left-hand side of the inequality be non-increasing in k ∈ R+.T h i s
is the case if and only if −cv00(c)/v0(c)i sl a r g e rt h a n−cu00(c)/u0(c)f o ra l l
c,w h e r ec plays the role of c0k. This means that adding inequalities e z
into the picture reduces the relative aversion to intertemporal ﬂuctuations of
consumption, i.e.,




This condition is very intuitive. Because we assume that growth is certain
and positive, the eﬃcient discount rate is larger than the rate of pure prefer-
ence for the present because of the wealth eﬀect. Because marginal collective
utility is decreasing, transferring consumption from the future to the present
raises current felicity more than it reduces future felicity. This argument to
raise the discount rate depends the speed at which marginal collective utility
decreases with consumption, which is measured by the aversion to intertem-
poral ﬂuctuations of consumption −Ee cu00(e c)/Eu0(e c). Inequalities e z raises the
discount rate in this context if it raises this aversion. This is reminiscent of
a problem raised by Gollier and Pratt (1996): Under which condition does
a zero-mean risk raise the absolute aversion to other independent additive
risks? This condition, that they called ”risk vulnerability”, depends upon
the sign of the fourth derivative of the utility function. Problem (9) is simi-
lar, but it diﬀers on the basis that we consider here multiplicative risks and
relative risk aversion.
Suppose ﬁrst that the intensity of inequalities is small, so that e z =1+λe ε,
with Ee ε =0a n dλ is small. Let us deﬁne function b R1 as follows:
b R1(λ)=−
Ec(1 + λe ε)u00(c(1 + λe ε))
Eu0(c(1 + λe ε))
.
It is easy to check that
b R1(0) = R1(c), b R
0









h εR1(c)R2(c)(R3(c) − 2 − R1(c)) + o(λ
3).
7Using the above equality and assuming that the intensity λ of inequalities is
small, condition (9) can be rewritten as
R2(c)[R3(c) − 2 − R1(c)] ≥ 0. (10)
This condition is necessary and suﬃcient for a small degree of inequalities
to raise the eﬃcient discount rate when the growth of consumption is a sure
positive constant. We hereafter assume that agents are prudent (R2 > 0).
Thus, this condition means that the degree of relative temperance is larger
than 2 plus the degree of relative risk aversion. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger
(2006) have deﬁned temperance in a very intuitive way. Consider two inde-
pendent zero-mean risk e ε1 and e ε2. If one prefers a 50-50 chance lottery to
have either e ε1 or e ε2 to another lottery with a 50-50 chance to get e ε1 + e ε2
or nothing, one is said to be temperant. Relative temperance R3 measures
this aversion to the aggregation of zero-mean risks. As shown by Eeckhoudt
and Schlesinger (2006), one ist e m p e r a n ti fa n do n l yi fu[4] is negative, i.e., if
u00 is concave. Notice that risk aversion corresponds to the parallel concept
where e ε1 and e ε2 are two sure losses, and R1 measures the aversion to this
aggregation of losses. Condition (10) tells us that the intensity of temper-
ance must not be too small compared to risk aversion, compared to the case
of a power utility function, for which condition (10) holds as an equality.
Thus this condition means that the diﬀerence between the aversions to the
aggregation of zero-mean risks and to the aggregation of sure losses must be
larger than in the case of power utility functions, where it equals two.
Let us now relax the assumption that the intensity of inequalities is small.
We can rewrite left condition in (9) as follows:
ER1(ce z)u
0(ce z) ≥ R1(c)Eu
0(ce z).
We hereafter show that this condition holds when R1 is decreasing and con-
vex. Indeed, this implies that
ER1(ce z)u
0(ce z) ≥ ER1(ce z)Eu
0(ce z) ≥ R1(c)Eu
0(ce z).
The ﬁrst equality comes from the fact that R1 and u0 are comonotone, and the
second inequality comes from the convexity of R1. Thus, when relative risk
aversion is decreasing and convex in consumption, consumption inequalities
always raise the eﬃcient discount rate when the growth rate of consumption
is a positive constant.
8This suﬃcient condition is quite restrictive. Let us look for the necessary
and suﬃcient condition. Condition (9) can be rewritten as follows:
Ef(e c)=0 = ⇒ Eg(e c) ≤ 0, (11)
with
f(c)=e c − c and g(c)=cu
00(c)+R1(c)u
0(c)
We can apply the diﬃdence theorem2 (Gollier and Kimball (1996), Gollier
(2001)), which states that a necessary and suﬃcient condition for (11) is
g(c) ≥ g0(c)f(c)/f0(c). It yields the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that all individual consumption levels grow at the
same sure positive rate. Inequalities raise the eﬃcient discount rate if and
only if for all c and c in the domain of consumption, we have that
cu
0(c)(R1(c) − R1(c)) ≥ u
0(c)R1(c)(c − c)(R1(c)+1− R2(c)). (12)
As u ﬃcient condition is that R1 be decreasing and convex. Condition (10) is
necessary.
Of course, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for inequalities to reduce
the eﬃcient discount rate is the symmetric condition where the inequality in
(12) is reversed. A suﬃcient condition is that R1 be increasing and concave.
T h e s er e s u l t sa r ee s s e n t i a l l yn e g a t i v ei nt h es e n s et h a tt h es i g no fi m p a c to f
inequalities on the eﬃcient discount rate depends on sophisticated conditions
(12) that relies on the fourth derivative of the utility function.
However, there is a realistic case in which the above proposition is useful.
Suppose that
u
0(c)=( c − cmin)
−γ ,
where cmin > 0 is some minimum level of subsistence. In that case, we obtain
that R1(c)=γc/(c − cmin), which is decreasing and convex in the relevant
domain of consumption c>c min. Thus, with such preferences, inequalities
always raise the eﬃcient discount rate when economic growth is certain.
2The diﬃdence theorem can be expressed as follows. Suppose that f and g are twice
diﬀerentiable in their joint domain D and that there exists c ∈ D such that f(c)=g(c)=0
and f0(c) 6= 0. Condition (11) holds for all random variables e c whose support is in
D if and anly if g(c) ≥ g0(c)f(c)/f0(c) for all c ∈ D. A necessary condition is that
g00(c) ≥ g0(c)f(c)/f0(c).
93.2 The growth rate entails a small zero-mean risk
In this section, we still assume that all agents face the same growth of their
consumption, but we now assume that this growth is uncertain . To isolate
the precautionary eﬀect, let us hereafter assume that e y =1+e k, with Ee k =0 .
In other words, the expected growth of consumption is zero. Equation (6)
that guarantees that inequalities raise the discount rate can be rewritten as
follows:
Ev0(c0(1 + e k))
v0(c0)
≤
Eu0(c0(1 + e k))
u0(c0)
. (13)
Let S(c)=c2u000(c)/u0(c)=R1(c)R2(c) denote the product of relative
risk aversion and relative prudence. This index is often referred to as the
aversion to downwards risk (Keenan and Snow (2005), Modica and Scarcini
(2005), Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2007), Emmerling (2010)). Emmerling
(2010) points out the role of S for the impact of inequalities on the eﬃ-
cient discount rate. Obviously, if e k is small, condition (13) holds if and only







By applying the diﬃdence theorem, we obtain the following results.
Proposition 2 Suppose that all individuals face the same small zero-mean
growth risk on their consumption. Inequalities raise the eﬃcient discount
rate if and only if for all c and c in the domain of consumption, we have that
u
0(c)(R1(c)R2(c) − R1(c)R2(c)) ≤ u
00(c)(c − c)R2(c)(R3(c) − 2 − R1(c)).
(15)
As u ﬃcient condition is that S = R1R2 be increasing and concave. A neces-
sary condition is given by
R2(c)[2− R1(c)R2(c)+R3(c)(R4(c) − 4)] ≤ 0( 1 6 )
for all c in the consumption domain.
Proof: Conditions (15) and (16) are obtained by applying the diﬃdence
theorem. The suﬃciency condition is proved as follows. Suppose that S is
10increasing. It implies that S(c0z)a n du0(c0z) are anti-comonotone. By the
covariance rule, it implies that
ES(c0e z)u
0(c0e z) ≤ ES(c0e z)Eu
0(c0e z).
Assuming that S is concave implies that ES(c0e z) ≤ S(c0)b yJ e n s e ni n -
equality. Combining this observation with the above inequality immediately
implies condition (14). ¥
Reciprocally, economic inequalities reduce the discount rate if and only if
inequality (15) is reversed. A suﬃcient condition is that S be decreasing and
convex. The reversed inequality in (16) is a necessary condition. The power
utility function is the limiting case in which conditions (15) and (16) hold as
equalities. Observe that our necessary condition (16) is quite sophisticated,
since it relies on R4, i.e., on the ﬁfth derivative of the utility function.
As in the previous section, let us consider the case u0(c)=( c − cmin)−γ,
with cmin > 0. Because S(c)=γ(γ +1 ) ( c/(c − cmin))2,Sis decreasing and
convex in the relevant consumption domain c>c min.I ti m p l i e st h a tw h e n
consumers face the same small zero-mean growth risk, inequalities reduce
the eﬃcient discount rate. From the previous section, we know that the
same eﬀect prevails when the the growth is a sure negative constant. Com-
bining these two results, we conclude that inequalities reduce the eﬃcient
discount rate when the risk on economic growth is small and has a negative
expectation. The eﬀect of inequalities on the discount rate is intrinsically
ambiguous when the expected consumption growth is positive, in the sense
that it is negative when the expected growth is small, and it is positive when
the expected growth is large.
This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 1. Following for example Ogaki
and Zhang (2001), suppose that u0(c)=( c−cmin)−γ, where cmin is normalized
to unity and γ = 2. In the spirit of the ”Twin Peaks” cross-country distrib-
ution of incomes documented for example by Quah (1997), suppose that the
distribution of initial consumption levels is e c0 ∼ (2,1/2;10,1/2). Suppose
also that the growth of individual consumption is e y ∼ (1+g−4%,1/2;1+g+
4%,1/2), where g is the expected growth rate. In Figure 1, we have drawn
the eﬃcient discount rate as a function of the expected growth rate g in the
unequal economy. The dashed curve corresponds to the eﬃcient discount
rate when all agents have the same initial consumption c0 =6 . When g =0 ,
only the precautionary eﬀe c ti sa tp l a ya se x a m i n e di nt h i ss e c t i o n ,a n dt h e
11Figure 1: The eﬀect of inequalities on the discount rate (in %) as a function
of the expected growth rate g (in %). We assume that u0(c)=( c − 1)−2,
δ =2 % , e c0 ∼ (2,2/3;10,1/3 ) ,n oc o n v e r g e n c e ,a n de y ∼ (1+g −4%,1/2;1+
g +4 % ,1/2),
impact of inequalities on the discount rate is negative. For larger expected
growth rates, the eﬀect of inequalities is reversed.
The reader should also be made aware of the fact that condition (14) is
necessary and suﬃcient for inequalities to raise the discount rate only when
the growth risk is small. When the growth risk is not restricted to be small,
this condition is not suﬃcient, as shown in Gollier and Kimball (1996). They
provide suﬃcient, necessary, and necessary and suﬃcient conditions on u and
v in the general case. One should use them in combination with the deﬁnition
of v,w i t hv0(c)=Eu0(ce z), to relax the assumption that the growth risk is
small in the above proposition. Given the already complex analysis in the
small, we decided to leave this for future research.
4T h e e ﬀect of economic convergence
In the previous section, we have assumed that all agents face the same uncer-
tainty about the growth rate of their future consumption. We examined the
impact of this permanent level of inequalities on the eﬃcient discount rate.
In this section, we examine another problem. We take the initial inequalities
12expressed by e c0 as given, and we examine the role of economic convergence
on the choice of the discount rate. This convergence takes the form of a neg-
ative statistical dependence between e c0 and the growth rate e y of individual
consumption.
T h en o t i o no far e d u c t i o ni ns t a t i s t i c al dependence that is useful in this
context was ﬁrst developed by Tchen (1980) and Epstein and Tanny (1980).
We identify the notion of more economic convergence to Tchen’s notion of
less concordance between the initial condition and the future expectations.
This means that a greater initial consumption zi goes with less optimistic
expectations about future growth. It is easiest to deﬁne their concept of ”less
concordance” by assuming that both e c0 = c0e z and e y have a discrete support.
Suppose that e z and e y can take respectively values z1 <z 2 < ... < zn and
y1 <y 2 <. . .<y p. Let pij =P r [ e z = zi,e y = yj] be the joint probability
that e z = zi and e y = yj.W e h a v e t h a t 0 ≤ pij ≤ 1a n dΣiΣjpij =1 .
We compare two economic contexts represented respectively by probability
matrices P =[ pij]a n db P =[ b pij]. We deﬁne a ”marginal-preserving reduction
in concordance” as any transformation in the probability distribution from





2 ,i < i
0,j< j
0, ∃ε>0:
b pij = pij − ε; b pi0j0 = pi0j0 − ε; b pij0 = pij0 + ε; b pi0j = pi0j+,;
whereas all other probabilities are unchanged. In words, b P is obtained from
P by substracting probability mass ε from the ”concordant states” (zi,y j)
and (zi0,y j0), and by adding probability mass ε to the ”discordant states”
(zi,y j0)a n d( zi0,y j). This is illustrated in Figure 2. Observe that marginal-
preserving reductions in concordance do not aﬀect the marginal distributions
of e z and e y. Following Tchen (1980) and Epstein and Tanny (1980), we say
that (e z,e y) undergoes a reduction in concordance if the new joint distribution
of this pair can be obtained from the original one by a sequence of marginal-
preserving reductions in concordance. They showed that this is the case if
and only if for all (z,y)i nt h es u p p o r to f( e z,e y),
b F(z,y) ≤ F(z,y), (17)
where F and b F are the initial and ﬁnal cumulative distribution functions
of (e z,e y). A less concordant cdf concentrates less probability mass in any
South-East quadrangle of R2.
13Figure 2: Transfer of probability masses that yields a marginal-preserving
reduction in concordance.
Deﬁnition 1 Consider two economies that are characterized by the cumula-
tive distributions F and b F of (e z,e y). We say that economy b F exhibits more
convergence than economy F if and only if condition (17) holds for all (z,y)
in the support of (e z,e y).
This yields immediately the following property of economic convergence,
which relies on the notion of First-order Stochastic Dominance (FSD): For
any z in the support of e z, the increase in economic convergence yields a FSD-
improvement in the distribution of e y | e z ≤ z. Adding the condition that this
change in distribution does not aﬀect the marginal distributions of e z and e y
yields an alternative deﬁnition of economic convergence.
We now examine the impact of an increase in economic convergence on
the eﬃcient discount rate rt deﬁned by equation (1). Because the marginal
distribution of e c0 is unaﬀe c t e db yi t ,w es e et h a tt h ei n c r e a s ei ne c o n o m i cc o n -
vergence raises rt if and only if it reduces Eh(e z,e y), with h(z,y)=u0(c0zy)).
Let us consider more generally any function h : R2 → R.F r o mt h ed e ﬁnition
of a marginal-preserving reduction in concordance of (e z,e y), it is clear that it






for all ε>0,This is true if and only if h is supermodular. In fact, Tchen
(1980) and Epstein and Tanny (1980) proved that any reduction in concor-
dance reduces Eh if and only if h is supermodular. Interestingly enough, the
reduction in concordance of (e z,e y) implies that e z+e y becomes less risky in the
sense of Rothschild-Stiglitz.3
The following proposition is a direct application of the above result, with
h(z,y)=Eu0(c0zy). The supermodularity of this h function is equivalent to
the condition that relative prudence R2 is uniformly larger than unity.
Proposition 3 Any increase in economic convergence raises the eﬃcient
discount rate if and only if relative prudence R2(c) is larger than unity, for
all c in the domain of consumption.
The intuition of this result is quite simple. Under the veil of ignorance,
the increased economic convergence reduces the uncertainty about the log
consumption lne ct =l n c0e z +l ne y. Under prudence, this tends to raise the
eﬃcient discount rate. However, it also reduces the expected future consump-
tion, since h(e z,e y)=e ze y is supermodular. This wealth eﬀect tends to reduce
the eﬃcient discount rate. Thus, the precautionary eﬀect generated by the
increased convergence needs to be large enough to guarantee the result. The
presence of the counterbalancing wealth eﬀect explains why the condition is
that R2 be larger than unity rather than 0. Notice that in the power case
with u0(c)=c−γ,R 2 = γ +1 , so that this condition is always satisﬁed. Em-
merling (2010) calibrates this model by using the SRES A2 baseline scenario
proposed in the last IPCC Report (2007) with 9 regions exhibiting economic
convergence.
Let us reexamine the simple numerical exercise of the previous section
with u0(c)=( c−cmin)−2, which implies that R2(c)=( γ+1)c/(c−cmin), which
is larger than unity in the consumption domain c> min . We assume that the
marginal distributions of e c0 and e y are as in the previous section, with g =2 % :
3To prove this, observe that the reduction in concordance raises Eφ(e z + e y) for all
φ concave. Moreover, the reduction in concordance does not aﬀect E(e z + e y), since the
marginal distributions are unaﬀected.
15Figure 3: Parameter k is an index of economic convergence.
e c0 ∼ (2,1/2;10,1/2) and e y ∼ (0.98,1/2;1.06,1/2). However, conditional
to being initially poor (c0 = 2), the probability of the high consumption
growth is 0.5(1 + k), with k>0. Similarly, conditional to being initially
wealthy (c0 = 10), the probability of the high consumption growth is a smaller
0.5(1 − k). This economic context is represented in Figure 3. Parameter
k ∈ [0,1] is an index of economic convergence, since an increase in k yields
a marginal-preserving reduction in concordance. We represented in Figure
4 the relation between the index of economic convergence and the eﬃcient
discount rate, for the original calibration with cmin = 1, and for the CRRA
case cmin = 0. As predicted by the above proposition, an increase in economic
convergence raises the eﬃcient discount rate. This eﬀe c ti si nf a c tq u i t e
dramatic for cmin = 1, since the discount rate goes from 8.04% in the absence
of convergence (k =0 )u pt o2 4 .29% in the case of maximum convergence
(k =1 ) .
16Figure 4: The discount rate as a function of the index of economic conver-
gence k. We assume that u0(c)=( c − cmin)−2,δ= 2%, and the economic
context is described in Figure 3.
174.1 Calibration
In this section, we calibrate a simple — but realistic — speciﬁcation of the
model in order to estimate the eﬀect of economic convergence on the discount
rate. Our calibration is based on the ERS International Macroeconomic data
set that gives us estimation of the GDP/cap for 190 countries over the period
1969-2009. Because of the extremely large heterogeneity of the 190 country
sizes, we deﬁned a set of 13 regions that are relatively homogenous in size and
in socio-economic structure.4 I nT a b l e1a n dF i g u r e6 ,w ep r o v i d ei n f o r m a t i o n
on population sizes, GDP/cap in 1969 and 2009, and its growth rates.
Suppose also that u0(c)=c−γ. Under the hypothesis that there is no
convergence, i.e., inequalities are permanent, we know that inequalities have
no eﬀect on the discount rate. The regional data set described above yields
μ = E log e y =0 .9047 and σ2
y = Va rlog e y =0 .5128. Let us assume that log e y
is normally distributed, which implies that the discount rate rt is described
by equation (5). Assuming δ =0a n dγ =2 ,w eg e trt =7 8 .38%. Expressed
on an annual basis, it yields r =1 .96%.
Let us now alternatively recognize that regional inequalities are not per-
manent. To test this, let us regress logy with respect to logc0:
logy =2 .89 − 0.26logc0 + e ε. (18)
The t-statistic of the slope coeﬃcient β equals −2.41, so that it is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from 0. The R2 of the regression is 0.35. This estimation provides a
strong basis to accept the hypothesis of economic convergence. We also get
that Va r(e ε)=0 .31. Let pi2009 denote the population size of region i in 2009.
Equation (1) can then be rewritten as follows:













If we assume that e ε is normally distributed, we get that
Ee
−γ(2.89+h ε) = e
−γ(2.89−0.5γVar(h ε)).
4In this process, we ignored 1.99% of the 2009 world population because of the diﬃculty
to allocate some countries to an homogenous region. This is the case for example for
Switzerland, Taiwan, and East European countries not in the EU27.
18Using β = −0.26 and Va r(e ε)=0 .31 together with the actual distribution
of e c0 in 1969, we obtain r =4 .06%. The existence of economic convergence
raises the eﬃcient discount rate from 1.96% to 4.06%. This eﬀect is sur-
prisingly large. It is in part explained by the phenomenal growth rate of
the Chinese economy during the period.5 Under the veil of ignorance, the
plausibility for poor countries to experience a growth rate similar to China
over the last 40 years yields a strong decrease in risk for future generations.
This basically reverses the precautionary argument:6 Because of economic
convergence, the future looks less risky than the present!
5C o n c l u s i o n
The recent debate on the intensity of the ﬁght against climate change has
raised the crucial question of the choice of the discount rate. The traditional
determinants of this rate are the wealth eﬀect and the precautionary eﬀect.
These eﬀects are simple to estimate when there is a representative agent in
the economy, i.e., when there is no inequalities and no asymmetric shocks
to income ﬂows, or when risks are shared eﬃciently in the economy. These
a s s u m p t i o n sa r eu n r e a l i s t i c .T h ea i mo ft h i sp a p e rw a st oe x p l o r et h ei m p a c t
of inequalities on the discount rate. When there is no economic convergence,
that is when inequalities are permanent, the sign of this impact relies on so-
phisticated conditions involving the fourth and ﬁfth derivatives of the utility
function. Assuming a power utility function with a minimum level of sub-
sistence, a permanent level of inequalities raises the discount rate through
the wealth eﬀect, and reduces the discount rate through the precautionary
eﬀect.
A simpler conclusion of this paper is that the eﬀect of inequalities on the
discount rate is mostly driven by how the degree of inequalities evolves over
time. If we believe that regional economies tend to convergence as suggested
by empirical evidence, then the discount rate should be positively impacted
5If China is removed from the data set, the R2 of the regression goes down to 0.09.The
β coeﬃcient goes up to −0.08, and is not anymore statistically signiﬁcant. The eﬃcient
discount rate equals 2.97% and 3.58%, respectively without and with convergence.
6Notice indeed that the Ramsey rule without uncertainty and inequality would yields
r = γμ, which corresponds here to 181%, or 4.52% per annum. Because the eﬃcient
discount rate of 6.45% is larger, it means that the precautionary eﬀect coming from risk
and inequalities raises the discount rate.
19by this phenomenon. Indeed, under prudence, the existence of relatively
large inequalities today compared to the future raises the marginal utility
cost of investing for the future.
Several extensions to these results should be explored. First, we assumed
in this paper that the costs and beneﬁts of the investment are equally distrib-
uted among all consumers in the economy. One should also examine other
distributions of cash ﬂows, for example when individual beneﬁts or costs are
proportional to GDP/cap. Because risks are not eﬃciently shared and credit
markets are ineﬃcient, marginal rates of substitution are not equalized, which
implies that the allocation of cash-ﬂows matters for the economic evaluation.
Second, more sophisticated stochastic processes for the n-country economic
dynamics should be considered in the calibration and in the estimation of
the model. Third, we did not really address in this paper the problem of the
term structure of discount rates, which may depend upon complex relations
between growth and inequalities.
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22GDP/cap Annualized 
REGION POPULATION  2009
1969 2009  growth  rate
North America  340 699 331  20 745  41 213  1,72% 
Latin America  585 675 448  2 841  5 242  1,53% 
EU15  387 805 629  15 834  33 410  1,87% 
EU27- EU15  103 777 223  3 452  9 053  2,41% 
Former Soviet Union  276 203 629  2 773  4 302  1,10% 
China  1 338 612 968  128  2 494  7,43% 
Japan  127 078 679  13 466  32 818  2,23% 
Southeast Asia  593 051 249  454  1 829  3,48% 
South Asia  1 566 502 232  247  814  2,98% 
Oceania  36 460 398  14 075  24 662  1,40% 
Middle East  279 897 739  3 319  5 415  1,22% 
North Africa  161 140 693  1 013  2 359  2,11% 
Sub-Saharan Africa  828 412 224  1 030  997  -0,08% 
 
Figure 5:
Table 1: Real GDP per capita for baseline regions 1969-2009.


















Figure 6: Change in log consumption as a function of log consumption in
1969. The size of the circles is proportional to regional population in 2009.
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